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Abstract Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception
does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make
top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for
foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epis-
temically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs
rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism
about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism
might be reconciled with PP from both an internalist and externalist perspective, and
argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP.
Keywords Foundationalism · Justification · Predictive processing · Epistemic
downgrade · Dogmatism · Inferentialist reliabilism
Introduction
In epistemological theories about perceptual justification, several versions of foun-
dationalism have become increasingly popular. On internalist versions of the view,
perceptual experiences, or perceptual seemings, provide immediate prima facie justi-
fication for basic perceptual beliefs, whereas on externalist versions basic perceptual
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beliefs derive their immediate justification from being the output of a properly function-
ing or reliable process.1 At the same time, predictive processing accounts of perception
(PP) have become increasingly popular in philosophy of mind, according to which per-
ceptual experiences and beliefs arise as the result of the brain’s attempt at predicting
sensory input on the basis of a large amount of stored knowledge. Given this latter
development, one might wonder whether epistemological theories about the structure
of justification do not presuppose an outdated conception of the mind. If all of our
perceptual beliefs only arise on the basis of acquired knowledge about the world, can
they still be epistemically basic as foundationalists maintain? It is the main goal of this
paper to review several ways in which foundationalists might respond to this challenge.
As a subsidiary aim, I intend to make plausible that an externalist foundationalism will
provide the best match with PP.
The first and second sections will give brief introductions of respectively founda-
tionalism about perception and a predictive processing account of perception. The
third section reviews several ways of combining PP with an internalist foundationalist
account of perception, beginning with a strong view according to which perceptual
experience provides immediate prima facie justification for belief despite what hap-
pens at the subpersonal level (Fumerton 2013; Huemer 2013), and ending with a weak
Siegelian view (Siegel 2012, 2013, 2017b) according to which even subpersonal pri-
ors are relevant for perceptual justification. Although the strong view clearly remains
foundationalist, PP appears to undercut its motivation for considering perceptual expe-
rience as the unjustified justifier of perceptual belief. The weak view, in contrast, can
ascribe a rational role to the background knowledge posited by PP, but has difficulties
in upholding its foundationalist roots. Section four reviews an externalist founda-
tionalism that sharply distinguishes between personal-level beliefs and subpersonal
assumptions and claims that personal-level beliefs can only be evidentially based on
other personal-level beliefs (Lyons 2009, 2016a). Although this plausibly entails that
perceptual beliefs cannot be evidentially based on the stored knowledge posited by PP,
the theory appears to lack a principled motivation for its different epistemic treatment
of personal-level beliefs and subpersonal assumptions. I end section four by outlining
an alternative externalist account according to which PP’s stored knowledge could
be considered as an evidential basis that is itself justified because of external factors
such as reliability. This would prevent positing an unprincipled distinction between
personal-level beliefs and subpersonal assumptions and still allow a foundationalist
take on PP—albeit one where the epistemic foundation surprisingly consists of a rather
malleable set of subpersonal assumptions.
1 Foundationalism about perception
According to contemporary foundationalists about perception, perceptual beliefs are
epistemically basic: their prima facie justification does not epistemically depend on any
1 See Tucker (2013b) for a collection of articles on ‘seemings’ theories of perceptual justification, and see
Lyons (2009) for a process reliabilism that makes the connection to foundationalism explicit.
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further beliefs. Immediately note three things about this characterization of basicality.2
First, being epistemically basic does not imply that the belief is infallible, incorrigible
or indubitable. Basic beliefs could be easily rejected in the light of additional evidence,
they merely provide a starting point for our inquiries. Second, being epistemically basic
leaves open whether beliefs are ultima facie or even prima facie justified. What matters
to epistemic basicality is the absence of epistemic dependence on further beliefs, not
the presence of what actually makes basic beliefs prima facie justified. Third, although
epistemically basic beliefs should not epistemically depend on further beliefs, they
might still depend on those further beliefs in different ways. For instance, to believe
that the color of a certain object is red, I might first have to know general things about
different colors and the way these colors look under different lighting conditions.
Perhaps some of this knowledge should be construed as knowledge-that rather than
knowledge-how. If so, this still does not imply that my belief that this object is red
epistemically depends on the general knowledge I have about colors. The general
knowledge might just count as an enabling condition to have beliefs about colors in
the first place. At the very least, it requires further argument to show that there is an
epistemic rather than mere conceptual or counterfactual dependence at work here.
The relevant type of epistemic dependence on beliefs that is at work in the foun-
dationalist theory appears to be one that is closely related to the notion of basing: if a
belief is based on further beliefs, then the belief epistemically depends on those further
beliefs and is not epistemically basic. We can distinguish this evidential dependence
from a weaker form of epistemic dependence between beliefs, where a belief weakly
epistemically depends on another if it would not be justified were the other belief
unjustified (Lyons 2016a). The latter form of dependence can be present even if there
is no evidential dependence; e.g., my belief that there is a chair over there weakly
epistemically depends on my belief that there is a physical object over there (if the
latter were unjustified, so would the former) but it’s implausible that it is also based
on the latter belief.3
Which precise beliefs will count as perceptual beliefs, and what it is in virtue of
which these perceptual beliefs are justified, will differ on different versions of the above
foundationalism. For instance, on a popular variety of internalist foundationalism about
perception, one might claim that perceptual beliefs are those that are immediately
based on perceptual experiences, and that they are prima facie justified in virtue of
the content and phenomenology of the perceptual experiences on which they are
based.4 In contrast, on an externalist foundationalism about perception, one could
claim that perceptual beliefs are those that are the output of a perceptual system,
and that they derive their prima facie justification from being the output of a reliable
2 This characterization of basic beliefs follows the one provided in Lyons (2009, p. 14).
3 Note that it’s open to foundationalists to also allow other relations of epistemic dependence besides
evidential dependence to play a significant role in their theory. For instance, externalist foundationalists
will typically hold that some beliefs can be non-evidentially justified by being the output of a reliable
process.
4 See, for instance, dogmatists about perception for such a view (Pryor 2000; Huemer 2001; Tucker 2010,
2013b; Chudnoff 2011).
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belief-forming process.5 The crucial difference between these two views is the role of
conscious experience: where such experience plays a necessary role for justification
on an internalist foundationalism, an externalist foundationalism can allow beliefs to
be justified even in the absence of any experience.6
What reasons are there for upholding foundationalism about perception? First, it
accords well with the phenomenology of perception. When we form our perceptual
beliefs we are usually not aware of any inference on the basis of our current experi-
ence and additional background beliefs. We usually just find ourselves immediately
believing things about our environment. However, this phenomenological fact is, at
best, a defeasible reason in favor of foundationalism about perception. That we are not
aware of inferring our perceptual beliefs from other beliefs does not imply that those
perceptual beliefs are, in fact, not inferred from other beliefs. Perhaps such inference
can simply take place unconsciously, thereby making perceptual beliefs non-basic. In
other words, even though perceptual beliefs are phenomenologically basic, they need
not be epistemically basic.
A stronger reason for foundationalism about perception is related to the regress
problem. If all beliefs can only be justified if they are supported by further justified
beliefs, then those justified beliefs must themselves also be supported by further jus-
tified beliefs, and so on, leading to an infinite regress of beliefs. Note that, on this
conception of justification, it will not help to allow that the beliefs at the beginning
of the justificatory chain can also help to support beliefs at the end of the chain: if
justification only arises from being supported by beliefs that are themselves justified,
then even a circular structure of support will not provide one with a first amount of
justification to transfer. The obvious way out of this regress problem is to change the
conception of justification at stake: some beliefs, i.e., epistemically basic beliefs, can
also be justified without support from further justified beliefs. Again, the way in which
these basic beliefs would then be justified could be cashed out in several ways; one
could hold that they are non-evidentially justified by simply being the output of a reli-
able process, or one could hold that they are evidentially justified by being supported
by conscious experiences that are themselves neither justified nor unjustified.7 Note
that it’s crucial that these conscious experiences need not themselves be justified, as
the regress would then simply continue on by asking where this justification in turn
would stem from.
Of course one could answer the regress problem differently, but these different
answers appear less plausible for the case of perception. Take, for instance, a coher-
entist answer, which holds that the justification for a belief emerges in virtue of being
a member of a coherent set of mutually supporting beliefs (or a member of a coher-
ent set of mutually supporting beliefs and experiences on a more liberal version).8
5 See Lyons (2009) for this view.
6 To keep things manageable, I’m leaving out hybrid internalist-externalist versions such as that of Alston
(1988) that could be taken to hold that justified perceptual beliefs require conscious experiences that reliably
indicate those beliefs. Nevertheless, such versions would also suffer from the problems outlined in Sect. 3.1.
7 See Lyons (2009) and Ghijsen (2016a) for more on the difference between being evidentially and non-
evidentially justified.
8 See, e.g., BonJour (1985) for a well-known account, and Kvanvig (1995) for a more liberal version.
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Such an answer would severely underestimate the epistemic force of perception, as
it would always make it possible to simply ignore whatever one perceived by adding
the belief that one was hallucinating. Although one could incorporate the epistemic
force of perception into one’s coherentism by requiring that one’s belief-system con-
tains beliefs about the importance of one’s perceptual beliefs (BonJour 1985), this
would go against the idea that justification simply emerges from coherence, and it
would also create difficulties for agents that lack the intellectual sophistication to have
higher-order beliefs of the envisaged sort.
Another answer to the regress problem, provided by infinitism, would hold that
the property of justification is again not transferred from a basic belief to a further
belief, but instead emerges from an infinite chain of reasons.9 On this account justi-
fication requires that there is a reason available for every justified belief, and for all
of these reasons there need to be further reasons available, and so on. What’s more,
these reasons cannot be used to support themselves: circular reason-structures are not
allowed. Applied to the case of perception, the account again appears less plausible
than a foundationalist one. As long as there is no reason not to trust the deliverances of
one’s senses, we simply do not require an infinite chain of reasons to justifiably believe
whatever one perceives. Of course it is always possible to question whether what one
perceives is actually the case, just as it is possible to then question the reasons one
could give for believing that what one perceives is actually the case, but the fact that
one can always ask for more reasons does not show that these reasons are really doing
any work in the original justification of the perceptual belief.
When it comes to perception, the foundationalist view thus appears to give the
most plausible answer to the regress problem: it accommodates the inherent epistemic
force that comes from perception, and is in line with what we require from agents who
have justified perceptual beliefs. The next section will attempt to put pressure on this
foundationalist view by exploring a challenge that arises from the idea that perception
is crucially connected to top-down prediction.
2 The challenge from predictive processing
According to Predictive Processing (PP) accounts of perception, perception is not a
purely bottom-up process that constructs a representation of the environment on the
basis of retinal input, but instead involves a top-down process which attempts to predict
sensory input on the basis of a hierarchical generative model. I will here follow Clark
(2013, 2016) and Hohwy (2013) in their presentation of the basics of PP, although
there are many different variations of PP and the way it is implemented in the brain.
Note further that, even though we will here only be concerned with the PP account
of perception, one of the motivations for PP comes from its surprising ability to also
explain action in terms of predictive processing [indeed, sometimes all of cognition
is portrayed as intrinsically related to predictive processing (Hohwy 2013)].
9 See Klein (1999). See Peijnenburg and Atkinson (2013) for a more detailed account of how justification
could emerge from an infinite chain of reasons.
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Let’s start by looking at the precise way in which sensory input is predicted accord-
ing to PP. Predictions take place at several levels in a hierarchical setting. Each level
in the hierarchy attempts to predict the state of the level below, and the lowest level
bottoms out in the sensory signal. Lower levels in the hierarchy correspond to faster
time-scale regularities (such as how light is being reflected by a moving object) and
higher levels to slower time scale regularities (from mid-level regularities concerning
what objects there are in front of us to even higher-level regularities concerning what
practices we are currently engaged in). The higher-level predictions constrain and
inform lower-level predictions in the sense that if I know that I am currently playing
tennis, then I can already predict which type of object is currently moving towards me
(i.e., the tennis ball). These predictions are then compared to the actual state of the
level that is being predicted, and the computed prediction errors are used as feedback
to sharpen or change the predictions at the higher level. In this way prediction errors
are in principle able to influence predictions all the way up to the highest level, while
predictions at the highest level also inform and constrain predictions at lower levels.
In the end, to find the hypothesis that fits the world best, all the sensory system has to
do is simply minimize prediction error.10
However, there is more to the story. In some circumstances one should expect a
larger amount of prediction error than others. For instance, if you are trying to find
your way at night in a badly lit environment, then the sensory input signal can be
expected to contain more noise than when you are walking around in clear daylight.
Similarly, if you are trying to hear what your friend is saying at a party, then you can
also expect more noise in the sensory signal than when you are listening to a speaker
in a lecture series. In terms of prediction error this means that in some circumstances
even the best hypotheses about the world will deliver relatively large prediction errors
due to noise in the sensory signal. In contrast, there can be other circumstances where
similarly large prediction errors are a sign that one should alter one’s predictions. So
the perceptual system has to do more than simply compute the prediction errors at all
of the levels in hierarchy, it also has to determine the extent to which these prediction
errors are due to imprecise and noisy sensory signals. In contexts where the sensory
signal is impoverished, prediction errors can then be suppressed without leading to
changes in predictions. In contexts where the sensory signal is very precise, prediction
errors can be taken seriously and thereby lead to changes in predictions.
So far I’ve said little about the way in which the predictions at the several levels in the
hierarchy are made. This is generally thought to occur in Bayesian fashion: by taking
into account how well a certain hypothesis is able to predict the sensory evidence (its
likelihood), and how probable that hypothesis is to begin with (its prior probability), the
posterior probability of the hypothesis given the sensory evidence can be calculated.
The hypothesis with, for instance, the highest posterior probability can then be selected
to determine perceptual content (although one could also expect the posterior to be
weighted with expected utility). Note again that the generation of hypotheses goes on
at all levels of the hierarchy, and that all these levels simultaneously influence this
generation. For instance, at a higher level in the hierarchy certain hypotheses about
10 See Friston (2009, 2010) for more on the relation between minimizing prediction error and the more
encompassing free-energy principle.
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the world around us (e.g., that objects have a uniform color) will have high priors,
which constrain the hypotheses arrived at in lower levels (e.g., that the wall has the
same color but is illuminated differently across its surface). On the other hand, high
prediction errors at lower levels can also lead to changes in the priors of hypotheses
at higher levels. It is this form of empirical updating of priors which makes sure that
one’s hypotheses are also shaped by the way the world actually is.
If PP is correct, then it seems the core tenet of foundationalism about perception,
i.e., that perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, is in trouble. After all, according to
PP perceptual beliefs are the outcome of a process that takes into account almost every-
thing that one has learned from previous experiences. Not only is a massive amount
of context information used to predict and thereby influence perceptual processing,
context is also used to determine to what extent the outcome of this perceptual pro-
cessing should be driven by prior expectations or sensory input by altering the weight
of prediction errors depending on their precision. What’s more, the process that is
involved appears to be constituted by a rational Bayesian form of reasoning, so it
does not appear to be a stretch to call one’s perceptual beliefs genuinely epistemically
dependent on what one learned from previous experience. In what sense could such
perceptual beliefs then still be taken as epistemically basic, as foundationalism about
perception maintains? The following sections will evaluate two responses to this chal-
lenge, the first from the perspective of an internalist foundationalism, and the second
from the perspective of an externalist foundationalism.
3 Internalist foundationalist answers
3.1 Strong internalist foundationalism
Recall that on an internalist foundationalism about perception, perceptual beliefs do
not epistemically depend on other beliefs for their prima facie justification, but instead
depend on being properly based on perceptual experience. A strong version of such
a view holds that the justification stemming from perceptual experience is simply
independent from whatever processes are involved in giving rise to this experience
(Huemer 2013; Fumerton 2013). Even if the process leading to perceptual experience
is along the lines sketched by PP, then this still does not make the beliefs based on this
experience any less basic.
One might doubt whether such a strong view is really tenable. It seems to allow
for cases where unjustified beliefs give rise to perceptual experiences which could
then justify those previously unjustified beliefs (so-called bad cases of cognitive pen-
etration) (Siegel 2012). For instance, suppose that Jill has the unjustified belief that
Jack is angry. If this belief is capable of actually making Jack look angry, then the
previously unjustified belief would suddenly become justified just because it is now
also supported by a perceptual experience that was itself generated by the unjustified
belief. This way of arriving at justified beliefs simply appears unacceptable, yet it is
allowed by the type of strong internalist foundationalism that is under consideration.
Sometimes this is even portrayed as a virtue of the theory: after all, if you really experi-
enced Jack as angry, what else could you believe but that Jack is angry? Unfortunately,
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this line of response does not do much to alleviate the previous worries: even if it is
rational to believe that Jack is angry in response to your experience, this does not entail
that the belief is also epistemically justified.11
Note, though, that PP does not entail that the previous sort of scenario is actually
possible. Nowhere in its account of perception does PP explicitly mention beliefs.
The priors, likelihoods and competing hypotheses could all be subpersonal states
rather than full-fledged beliefs.12 This accords with the fact that we might not readily
assent to the sort of information that is used in the hierarchical model proposed by
PP [e.g., that lighting usually stems from above, that stimuli will be repeated, that
slower motions are more likely than faster ones (Seriés and Seitz 2013)]. If there are
no beliefs involved in the process leading to perceptual experience, then PP clearly
does not license the previous kind of pernicious circular inferential structure where an
unjustified belief that p leads to a perceptual experience that p, which in turn justifies
the belief that p. In fact, given that PP upholds the idea that perceptual experience is
the result of a type of Bayesian abductive reasoning, the whole worry about this type
of circularity does not appear to get off the ground even if one assumes that priors are
also a type of belief. The content of the relevant priors does not simply become the
content of perceptual experience; the content of the priors is used to probabilistically
determine what content is the best explanation of the received sensory signal.13
Combining PP with a strong internalist foundationalism thus does not immediately
lead to counterintuitive results. However, the core idea of this foundationalism is still
that perceptual experience is a source of justification precisely because it is not itself
justified or unjustified, or rational or irrational. Perceptual experience is supposed to be
the a-rational given that is at the start of a chain of justification, it is not supposed to be
itself based on further evidence. If it were so based, then one of the key motivations for
foundationalism, i.e., its providing a satisfying answer to the regress problem, would
be undercut. Experience would no longer provide a starting point for justification but
would itself derive its justification from further evidence, for which the same question
of justification would then again arise.
If PP is correct, though, then it is no longer clear that we should not view experience
itself as the result of an inferential process that can be normatively evaluated, and
thereby as an entity that can be justified or unjustified, or at least rationally evaluated.
For instance, if priors are not updated in the light of new evidence, the experiences they
give rise to could be taken as unjustified, or as epistemically improper. The challenge
11 See Huemer (2013) for the line of response, and see, e.g., Jackson (2011), Tucker (2013a), Markie
(2013), and McGrath (2013) for the rejoinder.
12 Macpherson (2017) argues on this basis that it is not at all clear whether predictive processing entails
cognitive penetration. However, this is tricky territory, as in most purported cases of cognitive penetration
it will be difficult to specify whether any specific belief is cognitively penetrating perception anyway. See
Lyons (2011, p. 302) and Varga (2017, pp. 6–7) for more on this.
13 Note that Siegel (2017b, pp. 116–117) presents a different circularity problem for this Bayesian take on
perceptual experience: on the basis of one’s perceptual experience one might consciously strengthen one’s
credence in the very hypothesis that was selected to determine the content of that experience. In this case
there would be a bad type of double counting: first a posterior is calculated subpersonally, correctly taking
into account likelihoods and priors, and then that posterior is strengthened even more on the basis of the
very conscious experience that the posterior has supposedly determined. However, this worry only gets off
the ground if this form of conscious strengthening is really possible, something on which PP is silent.
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for a strong internalist foundationalism thus consists in explaining why subpersonal
inferential processes would be irrelevant in determining whether a subject’s perceptual
experiences, and thereby the subject’s perceptual beliefs, are justified.
Now, one answer to this challenge would have it that the kind of subpersonal
inferential processes at work in PP are not genuine inferential processes at all. At
best, the Bayesian story provided by PP presents us with a model of what is going
on subpersonally, but it is not a realistic description of the processes that actually
take place. In response, one could point out that the same is true for many cases that
would normally be taken as genuine cases of inference. For instance, in response to
seeing that it’s raining, I might infer that I should take my umbrella with me when I
go outside. We could describe this inferential process by listing all the premises that
would together imply that I should take my umbrella with me (e.g., that if it’s raining,
I will get wet; that I don’t want to get wet; that an umbrella would prevent me from
getting wet; etc.), but of course it’s implausible that this would provide a realistic
description of the processes that are actually going on subpersonally. So what a strong
internalist foundationalism would have to do is show that the notion of inference at
play in PP is radically different from the notion of inference that is operative in many
daily cases of reasoning.
One might think that this explanatory burden could be met. After all, a crucial dif-
ference between the inferences posited by PP and those in daily cases of reasoning lies
in their supposed conclusions: in daily reasoning the conclusion is a belief, whereas
the inferences posited by PP result in experience. This might lead one to doubt that PP
should be understood as being about genuine inferences from premises to conclusions
at all. However, this reasoning assumes that there is a crucial distinction between expe-
rience and belief that would make only the latter appropriate for being a genuine result
of inference. And, as long as one takes PP seriously, it’s not clear that this distinction
can be upheld. After all, we’re already supposing that perceptual experiences have
representational content that is calculated in Bayesian fashion, so there seems to be
no obstacle to supposing that this content is a genuine conclusion based on premises
constituted by priors and likelihoods in a way that we’re familiar with.14 This rep-
resentational content might not be sufficient to account for all aspects of perceptual
experience—for one, it seems to leave out the phenomenal aspect of experience—but
it does seem sufficient to account for the possibility of genuine inference.15
Another type of answer to the challenge would cite the inaccessibility of sub-
personal processes as the explanation of their irrelevance to justification. On the
assumption that only accessible entities are relevant for justification, only experiences
would come out as being relevant for the justification of perceptual beliefs. Now, this
answer seems unsatisfying to me on the grounds that many inaccessible things appear
to have an impact on justification.16 For instance, I might now apparently remember
14 But see Bruineberg et al. (2016) for a radically different content-free version of PP, though this is so
different that one might even hesitate to still call it a version of PP—it’s certainly not a version of PP as I
have described it.
15 Also see Siegel (2017b) for more on the relevant notion of inference at play, and more on possible
objections to an experience’s having a rational standing in virtue of its nature as experience.
16 Also see Jackson (2011) for this line of thought.
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that Barcelona is the capital of Spain, having completely forgotten that I had no good
grounds to believe this in the first place. Even though I can now only access a ‘memo-
rial seeming’ which supports that Barcelona is the capital of Spain, my belief is still
unjustified. It should not become justified merely because I have forgotten the fact that
I formed the belief without any good grounds. Similarly for perceptual experience:
if my subpersonal inferences do not work as they should, then the perceptual beliefs
I form on the basis of the illegitimately generated experiences should also not come
out as justified. Of course I do not think these considerations will be able to convince
strong internalist foundationalists to change their view, but they do provide us with
a reason to examine other candidates of foundationalism that could provide a better
picture of perceptual justification when combined with PP.
3.2 Weak internalist foundationalism
A weaker form of internalist foundationalism can be found in works by Siegel (2012,
2013, 2017a, b).17 According to Siegel, perceptual experiences can be epistemically
downgraded by their etiologies. In such cases the experience has less justificatory
power than it would ordinarily have because of the way the experience is produced.
For this to happen, it’s crucial that the etiology in question is rationally assessable
rather than merely a-rational, where the latter etiology only occurs in cases suffi-
ciently similar to cases of belief-formation where “[. . .] we would not regard either
ourselves or any of our subpersonal systems as convicted of any error if we ended
up with those beliefs via that kind of process [. . .]” (Siegel 2013, p. 713). A-rational
etiologies are thus connected to what one might call brute interventions on beliefs
or experiences, whereas rationally assessable etiologies are connected to inferential
transitions between contentful states.
According to Siegel, experiences with rationally assessable etiologies are epistem-
ically downgraded when they have an etiology that is “sufficiently similar” (Siegel
2013, p. 716) to a belief-etiology that would give rise to an unjustified belief. In her
latest work (2017b), Siegel specifies that this similarity consists in experiences’ being
literally the result of the same type of bad inferences as beliefs, such as starting from
epistemically inappropriate inferential inputs or jumping to conclusions.18 An exam-
ple would be a variant of the earlier mentioned case of Jill and Jack, where Jill fears
that Jack is angry and thereby jumps to the conclusion that Jack is angry on the basis
of his blank stare. Forming the belief that Jack is angry on the basis of Jack’s blank
stare is just as epistemically bad as forming a perceptual experience with the content
that Jack is angry on the basis of a (sub-)experience with the content that Jack has a
blank stare. Both are instances of a bad type of inference, i.e., jumping to conclusions,
and in both cases the role of fear appears similar: it somehow makes this inferential
transition happen even though the premise does not fully support the conclusion.
17 Note, though, that Siegel does not explicitly endorse a version of foundationalism and might even prefer
a version of coherentism.
18 This also allows Siegel to respond to worries about specifying in what way bad experience-etiologies
are similar to bad belief-etiologies, and why exactly those etiologies are the ones that are epistemically bad
(Vahid 2014; Lyons 2016b; Ghijsen 2016b).
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We can use this notion of experiential epistemic downgrade due to bad inference to
make room for an epistemic role of PP’s Bayesian inferences. If the Bayesian infer-
ences are not performed properly, by, for instance, not updating priors correctly or
simply ignoring some relevant hypotheses, then this could epistemically downgrade
the perceptual experiences that are formed on their basis (assuming that similarly
performed inferences with beliefs would lead to unjustified beliefs). Perceptual expe-
rience would, on this view, retain its ability to ground epistemically basic perceptual
beliefs, but it would be prevented from justifying them when the previous Bayesian
inferences were faulty.
Although the weaker form of internalist foundationalism thus seems to provide
a more palatable combination with PP, it still leaves a crucial question unanswered.
Why would Bayesian inferences only be able to undermine the justification provided
by perceptual experience rather than also be able to empower experience to provide
this justification in the first place?19 That is, why would perceptual experience be
the unjustified justifier in the chain of justification rather than another link which
simply transmits this justification from the Bayesian inferences? This question appears
especially pressing when one admits that rationally assessable etiologies have the
power to undermine justification but rejects that such etiologies can also provide
justification.
Siegel goes some way in accommodating this worry by not only allowing inferences
to downgrade perceptual experiences, but also allowing them to upgrade perceptual
experiences under the right conditions (2017b, ch. 7). Even so, talk of downgrade
and upgrade betray the thought that the baseline amount of justification provided by
experience stems not from the inferences which gave rise to the experience, but from
something present in the nature of experience itself. Indeed, Siegel is sympathetic to
the idea that perceptual experiences have what she calls “positive epistemic charge”
due to their presentational phenomenal character, the way in which experiences not
only represent but also present their subjects with the way the world is.20 However,
the relation between having a specific phenomenal character and having the power to
justify subsequent beliefs seems unclear for reasons mentioned before: your perceptual
experience presenting you with a specific state of affairs might make it reasonable to
believe that that state of affairs is occurring, but that does not yet show that such a
belief would also be justified. What’s more, the motivation for connecting the epistemic
status of experience to its etiology, namely, that there’s more to being an epistemically
proper experience than what might be accessible to the subject of that experience,
actually counts against granting perceptual experience the power to provide baseline
justification purely on the basis of its presentational phenomenal character. So the
idea that perceptual experiences provide a baseline amount of justification that can
only be modulated up or down by the quality of the preceding inferences looks like
an unhappy marriage of two diverging intuitions about justification.
19 Also see Ghijsen (2016b) for a slightly different take on this problem.
20 The idea that the specific phenomenal character of perceptual experience is responsible for its power to
justify can also be found in the works of many other internalist foundationalists (e.g., Tolhurst 1998; Huemer
2001; Pryor 2004; Tucker 2010; Chudnoff 2012; Bengson 2015). For discussion, see Ghijsen (2014).
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So perhaps we should look at an even weaker form of internalist foundationalism
that ascribes the source of justification for epistemically basic beliefs to the priors
and likelihoods on the basis of which perceptual experiences are formed according to
PP.21 Although we could still count this as a form of internalism on the grounds that
the relevant factors for justification are still part of a subject’s mental states [along
the lines of Feldman and Conee (2001)], it would become more difficult to see what
would be left of the foundationalism. Certainly not just any prior, for instance, will
count as a proper foundation for perceptual experience and belief. A crucial part of
PP’s proposal is that these priors are shaped in response to sensory input, prediction,
and prediction-error, so it is only after this process of shaping and calibration has
taken place that they can start to give rise to justified experiences and beliefs. What’s
more, even if one is reluctant to treat these priors as beliefs, perhaps they could still
be shaped by such beliefs. In that case, the whole idea that there are such things as
epistemically basic beliefs would become endangered.
In effect, it seems as if this final type of weak internalist foundationalism will have
to construe justification as a property that emerges once a certain proper set of priors
and beliefs is already in place, and so it would become more of a coherentist rather
than foundationalist view. But this still would not answer our earlier worries about
coherentism: not just any coherent set of priors and beliefs will do for justification, it
will need to be a set that is directed at reflecting how the world actually is. Although the
processes described by PP might take care of this worry, that is no part of a coherentist
view of justification. Perhaps what is needed is thus an externalist element in our
account of perceptual justification to link PP’s empirical updating to how the world
actually is. This is the topic for our next section.
4 An externalist foundationalist answer
4.1 Inferentialist strong reliabilism
According to an externalist foundationalist account of perception, perceptual beliefs
derive their justification from being the output of a reliable process rather than from
being supported by other beliefs. I will here focus on the account provided by Lyons
(2009, 2016a), as this is a nicely developed externalist account with regard to the
differences between basic and non-basic beliefs and conscious and unconscious evi-
dence. Although Lyons labels his account ‘inferentialist reliabilism’, for reasons that
will become clear I will label it here as an inferentialist strong reliabilism.
According to Lyons, a belief is epistemically basic if and only if its prima facie
justification does not evidentially depend on other beliefs, i.e., if it is not based on
other beliefs (Lyons 2009, p. 14). Such basic beliefs derive their justification, roughly,
from being the output of a reliable non-inferential process carried out by a specific
sort of cognitive system (Lyons 2009, p. 177). Non-basic beliefs, in contrast, require
that the beliefs on which they evidentially depend are justified and that the inferential
processes from which they stem are conditionally reliable (i.e., that they have a high
21 Note that an option like this is also presented by Siegel (2017b, pp. 50–51).
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truth-ratio given that the input beliefs are true). Note that these different conditions
for justification are actually part and parcel of any foundationalist view: given the
distinction between basic and non-basic belief, it’s no wonder that their source of
justification will be different. However, Lyons’ reliabilism is still exceptional in its
explicit focus on the differing conditions, and it’s the reason for calling the view
inferentialist reliabilism.
Once we apply these ideas to perception, we arrive at the result that perceptual
beliefs are basic because they are the output of a specific type of perceptual system,
and that they are justified because the belief-forming processes of this system are
non-inferential and reliable. However, if PP is correct, then it is no longer clear that
the relevant perceptual processes are non-inferential in the sense that their outputs do
not evidentially depend on further beliefs. Perceptual processing is performed on the
basis of empirically derived priors, and even if one would not want to identify these
priors with beliefs, then we could still question whether there is not still a relevant form
of evidential dependence present here. Again, such a form of evidential dependence
between purported basic beliefs and subpersonal priors would seriously undermine one
of the key motivations for foundationalism, i.e., its answer to the epistemic regress
problem.
Lyons’ response to this worry is that only beliefs of the agent can be evidentially
relevant (Lyons 2016a, p. 249). As noted before, the priors in PP appear to belong to
subpersonal mechanisms and should not be identified with beliefs that are had by the
agent herself.22 The fact that subpersonal priors thus do not play any evidential role
on Lyons’ account, even though agent-level beliefs can play such an evidential role,
is my reason for calling this view an inferentialist strong reliabilism.
Of course, we would like to have a principled reason for holding that subpersonal
priors cannot play any evidential role, otherwise the inferentialist strong reliabilist
account will not have fully addressed the worries raised by PP.23 According to Lyons,
there is at least an indication that subpersonal priors do not play an evidential role in
light of the fact that their epistemic status appears to be irrelevant to the epistemic
status of the agent’s perceptual beliefs:
The normal human visual system, for example, operates on several assumptions
[or priors], including that nearby objects are lit from above, and that retinally
adjacent points are probably roughly equidistant from the perceiver. An ordi-
nary agent, who isn’t versed in the principles of perceptual psychology, might
well have very good reason to doubt such claims about light sources or retinal
22 Note that Lyons’ distinction between personal-level and subpersonal beliefs need not map neatly onto the
distinction between either conscious and unconscious or accessible and inaccessible beliefs. Unconscious
and inaccessible beliefs might still be personal-level. For examples, see Lyons (2016a, p. 247 and pp. 252–
253).
23 Couldn’t Lyons address this worry by simply maintaining that PP is at best seen as a model of perceptual
functioning rather than a realistic description of what is going on at the implementational level (compare
the strong internalist foundationalist response voiced in Sect. 3.1). Perhaps, but (a) it’s not clear to me that
such a model couldn’t be used exactly to determine whether a belief is justified and, if not, why it isn’t,
and (b) a similar view should then be used to address paradigm cases of inference (are all of the beliefs
really being used as premises to reach the conclusion at the implementational level?), which would make
it doubtful that much inferentialism would remain of Lyons’ inferentialist reliabilism.
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adjacency, rendering these beliefs or assumptions unjustified. But this wouldn’t
threaten the justification of her perceptual beliefs, at least not so long as she was
unaware of how such assumptions are causally relevant to things looking the
way they do. But if a belief/assumption’s being unjustified doesn’t detract from
the justification of beliefs that causally depend on it, then the assumption isn’t
serving as evidence for those beliefs.
(Lyons 2016a, p. 249)
Assuming that Lyons is correct in his criterion for deciding when an assumption is
not serving as evidence for a belief, then his conclusion is still not watertight. The fact
that an agent has good reason to doubt claims about light sources or retinal adjacency
does not immediately show that the visual system’s priors about light sources or retinal
adjacency are unjustified. After all, these priors have incorporated information from
innumerable other occasions, and could remain justified in the face of the agent’s
personal-level contrary reasons. Indeed, if we genuinely want to distinguish between
subpersonal assumptions and personal-level beliefs, then we should also be careful not
to conflate their possible conditions for justification. If that’s correct, then the example
simply does not show that subpersonal priors do not evidentially justify perceptual
beliefs.
As a sidenote, a similar point can be made about Lyons’ contention that the assump-
tions responsible for implicit bias should be seen as introspectively inaccessible
personal-level beliefs rather than as subpersonal assumptions of perceptual systems.
A crucial difference between the assumptions relevant for bias and the assumptions
of the visual system is supposedly related to the way in which these are acquired:
Simply hearing my drunken, racist uncle spout nonsense about the location
of light sources—even thousands of times—won’t affect my visual system’s
assessments of convexity. But if his nonsense is about ethnic groups, it can have
an effect on me, despite my better judgment.
(Lyons 2016a, p. 253)
Again, though, even if the drunken uncle is spouting nonsense about the location of
light sources thousands of times, the visual system also has access to tons of perceptual
evidence about the location of light sources that is in conflict with the testimonial
nonsense. The example thus does not show that testimony can never impact priors
within the perceptual hierarchy, and, indeed, one might claim that implicit bias is
exactly a case where testimony is able to influence these priors. Perhaps it is true that,
say, some job applicants are literally perceived as less qualified because of implicit
bias. That is still an open question, and one that might be answered affirmatively if PP
is on the right track.
Nevertheless, Lyons is surely right in his observation that, in general, there is a
difference in the way the visual system arrives at its subpersonal priors and the way in
which we arrive at our personal-level beliefs (Lyons 2016a, p. 250). Our personal-level
beliefs can be swiftly altered in the light of only one new piece of information, whereas
the priors of the visual system are updated far more slowly on the basis of accumulated
prediction errors. This means that even if I receive very strong testimony about, say, the
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location of light sources, this will never have an immediate impact on the priors of my
visual system. This what we may call “weak informational encapsulation” of the visual
system appears sufficient to distinguish belief-acquisition via the perceptual system
from belief-acquisition via inference on the basis of other personal-level beliefs. But
the question is whether the weak informational encapsulation of this belief-forming
process is also sufficient to count its output-beliefs as epistemically basic.
Weak informational encapsulation at least makes plausible that our perceptual
beliefs do not evidentially depend on our other personal-level beliefs. Personal-level
beliefs impact perceptual beliefs only via slow changes in the perceptual hierarchy, and
this makes it plausible that the perceptual beliefs are not based on the personal-level
beliefs.24 But this still leaves open whether perceptual beliefs are based on subpersonal
priors of the perceptual system. Although this possibility again seems to put pressure
on the key motivation for foundationalism, i.e., its solution to the epistemic regress
problem, there might be a way to respond to this worry. In the final section of this
paper I will sketch an externalist foundationalist view that would allow an evidential
role for subpersonal priors without leading to an infinite epistemic regress.
4.2 Inferentialist weak reliabilism
Where on the earlier inferentialist strong reliabilism, perceptual beliefs were non-
evidentially justified by being the output of a reliable perceptual process, an inferential-
ist weak reliabilism will hold that subpersonal priors themselves are non-evidentially
justified by being acquired in a reliable way. This will allow the inferentialist weak
reliabilist to assign an evidential role to subpersonal priors without falling prey to an
epistemic regress problem. Note immediately that this inferentialist weak reliabilism
will have a crucial virtue over the earlier discussed weak internalist foundationalism:
it will be able to ground the types of priors capable of providing evidential justifica-
tion by linking their own justification to an externalist clause (such as being reliably
acquired). So, unlike the weak internalist foundationalist, who only had recourse to
something like coherence to justify priors, the inferentialist weak reliabilist can appeal
to the prior’s connection to the world to explain its justificatory status. We thus have a
truly foundationalist answer to the epistemic regress problem, although the foundation
will plausibly consist out of a large interconnected set of subpersonal priors rather than
a couple of special beliefs about the world.
To get a better grip on the differences between the two versions of inferentialist reli-
abilism, consider the following case. Suppose one’s perceptual priors are influenced by
biased media coverage, which depicts a certain social group as associated with violent
crimes about 45% of the time, whereas members of this group are only responsible
for 5% of violent crime. These influenced priors can plausibly lead one to perceive
members of the relevant social group as dangerous, thereby leading one to believe that
these members are in fact dangerous. On the sketched inferentialist weak reliabilism,
one would have to look at how the relevant priors were acquired to determine whether
24 If such beliefs can be said to impact the hierarchy at all. Perhaps it’s more accurate to say that the
information on which the beliefs are based is having a slow impact on the perceptual hierarchy.
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the inferred perceptual experiences and beliefs would be justified. Assuming that the
relevant process of prior-acquisition can be seen as unreliable (acquisition via a biased
sample), the inferentialist weak reliabilism would give the verdict that the perceptual
beliefs are unjustified. After all, given that the relevant priors here are unjustified, so
would the subsequent experiences and beliefs based on those priors, given that this is
a type of inferential justification.
In contrast, the inferentialist strong reliabilism would have to look at the perceptual
process at work when one perceives a specific member of the wrongly depicted social
group, and determine whether that process is unreliable. Here it is more difficult to
argue on a principled basis that the relevant perceptual process type is unreliable; it
certainly is not obvious that the process type should be taken as specific as being
only about categorizing members of that specific social group as dangerous or not.
Of course both versions of reliabilism will still need a principled way of specifying
which precise process types are relevant to justification [Conee and Feldman’s (1998)
well-known Generality Problem for reliabilism] but at least the inferentialist weak
reliabilist view might have an easier time by looking at the process of acquiring the
relevant priors, whereas the inferentialist strong reliabilist view will have to look at
the process that is operative when the priors are being put to use.25 It should be noted,
though, that the process of acquiring priors might be more vague than the process of
forming beliefs, as this will be a more temporally extended process: we should be
looking at the influence of specific sorts of sensory input on multiple occasions—
even if inferential processing will also be important on each of those occasions (with
questions ranging from whether the data sets were not too idiosyncratic to whether the
priors were updated in the right way). The inferentialist weak reliabilist view might
thus get a better handle on some complex cases due to its focus on prior acquisition
rather than the way they are exploited, though it will definitely need to say more about
how to delineate such processes of acquisition.
Another consideration in favor of an inferentialist weak reliabilism has to do with
drawing a principled line between those entities that are evidentially relevant and those
that are not. We already saw that it is difficult to find a principled reason to hold that
only agent-level beliefs, in contrast to subpersonal priors, can be evidentially relevant
for further beliefs. Although Lyons does present a weak indication that the subpersonal
is evidentially irrelevant (Sect. 4.1), what we would like is an explanation of why this
is so. We might have a better chance of providing such an explanation if we draw the
line of evidential significance at the level of subpersonal priors. These are the mental
entities at the beginning of inference, so this is where we should draw the line between
evidential relevance and non-evidential relevance. The extra-mental processes whose
reliability will determine the justification of the priors themselves will then be those
that are non-evidentially relevant.
One important worry here has to do with the fact that priors are themselves presum-
ably generated and updated in response to innumerable encounters with sensory input,
25 Couldn’t the inferentialist strong reliabilist point at the inaccuracy of the priors to explain why the relevant
perceptual process is unreliable? Perhaps, but there could also be cases with accurate but unreliably acquired
priors, e.g., when one comes across unreliable information that nevertheless gets it right. See Vaassen (2016,
pp. 10–11) for a case that could be developed in this direction.
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perhaps starting with some that are simply innately specified. So shouldn’t the chain
of evidential justification then continue on from one’s current priors to those that got
the updating-process going from the get-go? That need not be the case: whenever a
perceptual belief is formed, the inferential process will simply terminate at the set of
priors that are present and relevant at that time.26 This is so even if those priors would
not be justified if earlier priors hadn’t been justified.
To see this, compare the case of memorial beliefs. I might now remember that q
because I long ago deduced it from another belief that p and a belief that if p, then q.
If by now I have long forgotten about those other beliefs, then the memorial belief that
q should no longer be construed as being evidentially based on them. Yet whether the
retained belief was originally justified, and whether the original inference was a good
one, still appears relevant to the justification of the memorial belief. So there are cases
where historical facts about the justification of earlier beliefs matter for the justificatory
status of one’s current beliefs, even though the current beliefs are no longer evidentially
based on those earlier beliefs. The same could be true for subpersonal priors: how they
came about is certainly relevant for determining their justification, but this etiology
need not itself be a further evidential factor that supports perceptual belief. By taking
this route one can maintain that there is an evidential foundation in perception, even if
this foundation is to be found at a deeper (subpersonal) level than originally expected.
Conclusion
I have explored several ways in which one is able to maintain a foundationalist account
of perception in the face of the challenge from predictive processing. On a strong inter-
nalist foundationalist account, one should simply ignore subpersonal processes, and
focus only on the content and phenomenology of experience to determine whether a
belief is epistemically basic and prima facie justified. The challenge for this view is
to explain why subpersonal inferences of the sort posited by PP are irrelevant to the
epistemic status of experience itself. On a weaker form of internalist foundationalism,
one can either accept that subpersonal processes can merely diminish perceptual jus-
tification when such processes are faulty, or else accept that subpersonal processes are
also relevant in determining whether experience itself is justified. The former view
leaves unexplained why subpersonal processes could only be relevant in diminishing
perceptual justification rather than also providing a source for this justification, and the
latter view cannot explain why only a specific set of subpersonal priors could account
for perceptual justification (as foundationalism would maintain).
An externalist foundationalism appears to provide the best fit with PP, as it can easily
acknowledge that subpersonal processes are also relevant in determining perceptual
justification without positing an asymmetry between how that justification is produced
and how it is diminished. However, the specific version of externalist foundationalism I
have discussed, i.e., inferentialist reliabilism, will have to choose whether the epistemic
foundation it envisages is constituted by reliably produced, personal-level perceptual
26 What if, as a referee notes, evidential dependence can be broader than just inferential dependence? This
seems not only problematic for this specific response to the worry, but also for foundationalism in general.
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beliefs or by reliably acquired subpersonal priors. The former strong account will need
a principled reason for holding that only personal-level beliefs can be evidentially
relevant, and it is exactly at this point that the latter weak account seems better off: the
evidential regress stops at the subpersonal priors as these are simply the mental starting
points of inference. What’s more, the inferentialist weak reliabilism might also provide
a slightly better handle on the complex ways in which perceptual justification could
be affected by etiology, as it immediately directs attention to how certain perceptual
priors are acquired.
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